Weaning the U.S. Military Off a Tablet Supply Chain That Leads to China

Estimated reading time: 4 minutes

Editor’s Note: This piece originally appeared on Defense Opinion, click here to access the website directly.

Tablet computers are essential to how our military fights, moves and sustains, but these devices are built on a fragile global supply chain with strong ties to China. Building domestic manufacturing to eliminate this vulnerability is feasible if we tap into the information and capabilities that already exist and create strong demand for tablets produced by trusted and assured sources.

During recent discussions at the Department of Defense, officials indicated that current tablet demand is in the tens of thousands, with significant expansion planned over the next five years. This reflects a broader trend in mission-critical operations, where commercial tablets are increasingly used for aircraft avionics interfaces, logistics and command-and-control functions.

Tablets used by the military are assembled with displays, microelectronics and circuit boards that trace back to companies under China’s control, with some flagged by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2021 for ties to the Chinese military.

Although these systems are heavily vetted by U.S. agencies that provide authority to operate after rigorous review, no level of screening can mitigate the risks that come with relying on hardware that’s controlled by an adversary.

China could easily manipulate the supply chain, shutting off access to tablets and their components partially or completely or compromising their security and integrity through the inclusion of unauthorized or malicious capabilities.

The issue affects more than military platforms. Tablets are also used in critical infrastructure, such as banking, medical systems, utilities and transportation systems. These industries face the same vulnerabilities associated with China’s domination.

To fully eliminate the risk, the U.S. must create a strong and assured domestic supply chain for tablet production.

How to build a safer supply chain

 We already have the data. Publicly available reports from firms like TechInsights and iFixit detail the bill of materials for nearly every commercial tablet on the market. These identify processors, memory, display drivers, analog integrated circuits, sensors and printed circuit boards (PCBs), complete with manufacturing sources and technology nodes.

A task force of industry experts can map this data into actionable categories. Whether it’s ultra high-density interconnect (UHDI) PCBs, display drivers or system-on-chip (SoC) processors, each category can be paired with domestic or allied sources.

Intel, GlobalFoundries, Micron, Texas Instruments, SkyWater, Onsemi, Qorvo, Wolfspeed and many others already provide much of the foundry technologies. Design and turnkey service providers, such as Trusted Semiconductor Solutions and Phoenix Semiconductor, form vital links in the supply chain from design to qualified component.

Packaging and assembly providers like Micross and Integra Technologies, VSLIP Technologies, Amkor (U.S. operations) and Texas Instruments (internal and partner capabilities) add further support. Large and small electronics manufacturing services companies that include Valtronic, Zentech Manufacturing, Jabil, Sanmina, Benchmark and Plexus offer trusted U.S.-based system integration and production capacity.

Build and demonstrate the full chain

As part of this process, the U.S. will need to build and fund demonstrators that prove domestic production can meet both performance and reliability requirements. These demonstrators should address the full chain, from assured semiconductors and packaged components to final assembly.

For example, a focused effort with Intel to deliver a demonstrator application processor for a domestically sourced tablet could help validate and de-risk the company’s commercial pathways, while serving as a strategic investment to help stabilize this pillar of our national semiconductor capacity. We also should engage domestic PCB suppliers like Calumet, Greensource and TTM. These companies are currently standing up advanced capabilities that include UHDI, ensuring they can demonstrate production readiness and rapidly scale output to meet demand.

Identifying and funding these demonstrators will help quickly shift from risk awareness to readiness.

Scale with increased demand

To spur companies into tablet production, the U.S. must ensure strong demand for domestically produced products. This is also key to avoid repeating past attempts that couldn’t compete globally.

If the DoD buys 500,000 tablets, that’s a start. Layering on demand from critical infrastructure, federal agencies, first responders and state governments could drive volumes into the millions. That’s enough to make domestic sourcing commercially viable if there’s a mandate to buy from trusted and assured sources. Our allies have the same needs, which would add even greater volume to the demand.

With proper incentives and standards, we can expand this base to serve the entire economy, delivering security, reliability and resilience at scale.

We should stop rewarding the lowest-cost bidder whenever it comes at the expense of national security. Buyer-directed assurance requirements tied to trusted standards will realign incentives and bring accountability back to procurement.

Some globally recognized standards for electronic manufacturing already exist. For example, IPC-1782, IPC-1791 and IPC 1792 together provide frameworks for traceability, supply chain management, cybersecurity and secure manufacturing practices. These can be adapted and embedded into DoD acquisition and applied consistently across services and suppliers.

Building an end-to-end domestic supply chain for tablet production eliminates the vulnerabilities and risks of relying on China for these mission-critical devices. This initiative could also serve as a blueprint for onshoring manufacturing for other products critical to defense and infrastructure. For example, applying similar approaches to the more than 6,500 Chinese-origin components found in the Ford-class aircraft carrier could significantly de-risk one of the U.S. military’s most important weapon platforms.

We know the risks. Let’s start building the solution.