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Defense Speak Interpreted: JADC2—Why It’s More Relevant Than Ever in Drone Warfare

When I first published this column in 2020, the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) was hot news in defense circles, but when was the last time you heard about it? You’re probably thinking, “There goes another defense program that fell by the wayside.” However, that’s not true. As JADC2 continues to develop, the need for rapid communication between soldiers, sensors, radars, computers, and weapon systems is greater than ever.

Two Current Takes
First, look at how the Ukraine/Russia conflict is being fought. Drones have taken over. 

I asked Google Gemini, “Who has more drones, Russia or Ukraine?” Here’s the answer I received:

"While it's difficult to pinpoint an exact number, Russia is generally considered to have a larger drone arsenal and production capacity than Ukraine. Russia has been significantly increasing its drone production, including long-range and tactical drones, while Ukraine has also ramped up its drone capabilities and production. 

• Russia's Drone Advantage: Russia is reported to have a larger overall drone fleet and is also significantly increasing its drone production, with assistance from other countries. 
• Ukraine's Drone Efforts: Ukraine has also made significant strides in drone warfare, producing over 1 million drones last year and planning to double that number this year. 
• Drone Warfare in the Conflict: Both sides are heavily utilizing drones in the conflict, with both sides launching hundreds of drones on a nightly basis, including large-scale attacks. 
• Ukraine's Defensive Efforts: Despite the scale of Russian attacks, Ukraine has demonstrated effectiveness in intercepting and neutralizing many of the incoming drones. 
• Impact of Drone Warfare: The widespread use of drones in this conflict is reshaping the nature of warfare, with cheap, mass-produced drones becoming key weapons."

Second, President Trump is promoting the concept of a “Golden Dome” to protect the United States from the spectrum of weapons below ICBMs: hypersonic rockets, cruise missiles, and drones. The electronics problem in this warfare is complex: detection, tracking, decision on countermeasures, launch of defense interceptors, and destruction of the incoming weapon.

Detection: It used to be easy, considering that the Star Wars program concentrated on ICBMs. Firing an ICBM creates a lot of heat, easily detectable from space with an IR sensor. However, there is no heat signal from a battery-powered drone, and the signature from a cruise missile is a lot smaller than an ICBM. These present new detection sensor problems. I see this as the biggest issue that needs solving by the Golden Dome. Watch for detection publicity. Additionally, sensors would need to be everywhere. The Ukrainians smuggled drone-laden trucks near distant (1,000 miles or more) Russian air bases, launched the drones, and had time to fly them around the planes on the ground, looking for the best place to crash and detonate on each target plane. 

Tracking: Radar should have no problem tracking large ICBMs. I have not seen anything about stealth ICBMs. However, cruise missiles and smaller rockets can fly long distances at treetop levels, challenging radar detection. Finally, drone detection is a whole new ballgame. This reminds me of the Pringles cans on drones¹ developed on the Ukraine battlefield. A $100 commercial drone with a Pringles can filled with C4 explosives onsite took out a multi-million-dollar Russian tank.

Decision: I think Americans believe Israel’s Iron Dome shoots down all incoming weapons, but this is not true. They analyze each incoming weapon for its potential to damage a key target. If it’s not on a dangerous course, I say they should let the weapon fly and detonate it “harmlessly,” so it destroys a wheat field. Decisions on countermeasures must either be AI-calculated or else made by a massive network of military personnel at monitors, alerted by AI scanning of field sensors. 

Interception: The Star Wars program is partly based on Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)—using a missile to intercept a threatening missile in space, preferably at high altitude. If the threat is nuclear, the resulting damage/radiation from the intercept would be less harmful than an explosion anywhere near Earth. However, how do you intercept the new, smaller human-guided weapons? Fighter jets may have a chance at cruise missiles if launched in time. In the Red Sea, the U.S. has been using expensive ship-launched missiles to take out rather cheap Houthi launches. Finally, machine guns may be the only ballistic defense against drones. They make every effort to RFI jam the incoming threatening drone guidance, but even there, the newer, wire-guided drones are immune to jamming. Additionally, RFI jamming probably takes out all electronic communication.

Destruction: The options remaining are: explode another missile on/near the target, or shoot it down with a fighter-launched small missile or gunfire. With drones, the options are either to try to jam communications or to hit them with a lucky bullet.

JADC2’s Current Standing
In 2022, the Pentagon formalized five Lines of Effort (LOEs) for JADC2 to “organize and guide actions to deliver materiel and non-materiel JADC2 capabilities. The LOEs are: (1) Establish the JADC2 Data Enterprise; (2) Establish the JADC2 Human Enterprise; (3) Establish the JADC2 Technical Enterprise; (4) Integrate Nuclear C2 and Communications (NC2/NC3) with JADC2; and (5) Modernize Mission Partner Information Sharing.”²

Is JADC2 in place? No. 

“Each military branch has its initiative that contributes to JADC2; the Army has Project Convergence, the Navy has Project Overmatch, and the Air Force has the Advanced Battle Management System, also known as ABMS. The Space Force has the Space Development Agency's National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA).”³

So, what will it take to get JADC2 off the ground? See my April column on continuing resolutions in Congress. The Department of Defense requested funding to complete JADC2 in 2024. However, because it was a new program and Congress failed to pass a budget, the department could not begin the final phase. The same situation is playing out this year, as the continuing resolution remains in effect. It’s a case of hurry up and wait.

References

1. “Pringles cans on drones: Ukraine’s weapons ingenuity takes all forms,” by Tom Mutch, Defense News, June 20, 2025.
2. “Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control (JADC2) Strategy, U.S. Department of Defense.
3. “Joint All-Domain Command and Control,” Wikipedia.

Denny Fritz was a 20-year direct employee of MacDermid Inc. and retired after 12 years as a senior engineer supporting the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Crane, Indiana.